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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE AU, AND THE
ICC: LEGITIMACY UNDERMINED
Christa-Gaye Kerr*
The International Criminal Court (the “ICC” or “the Court”) was
created with the expectation that it would supplement regional and national
1
judicial systems and that it would be a court of last resort. The Rome
Statute highlights that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
2
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crime.” Because of its
supplementary role, the ICC’s jurisdiction can only be invoked in limited
situations: namely, when regional and national courts are unwilling or
unable to prosecute criminals, when the United Nations Security Council
(“UNSC”) instructs the Court to act, or when individual states refer
3
situations to the Court. In its sixteen-year history, the Court’s jurisdiction
has been invoked through all three methods, resulting in charges in eleven
4
5
cases. In ten of these cases, the defendant has been African.
The disproportionality of these numbers has led to criticism that the
ICC is just another tool for enforcing Western political influence over
6
international justice. The Court’s critics see its record of failing to
prosecute serious international crimes outside of Africa as “sidelin[ing]
*
Articles Editor, Michigan Journal of International Law; J.D. Candidate, University
of Michigan Law School, 2020. I would like to thank the MJIL editors who worked on this
piece for their invaluable feedback and keen attention to detail. I would also like to thank
Professor Laura Beny for her constant encouragement and her belief. To my family and
friends, thank you for your unwavering support through law school and through this process.
1.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, About, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Dec. 17,
2019).
2.
Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct. pmbl., 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3.
Id. arts. 13–15 ter. As outlined in article 13, “[t]he Court may exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of
this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with article 15.” Id.
4.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Situations Under Investigation, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
pages/situations.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter ICC Situations] (stating that the
ICC currently has investigations ongoing in Burundi, Georgia, Central African Republic [two
cases], Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo).
5.
Id.
6.
See, e.g., Lee J. M. Seymour, The ICC and Africa: Rhetoric, Hypocrisy
Management, and Legitimacy, in AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE, 107, 109
(Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016).
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Africans as it favours Western intervention in the guise of universal
7
justice.”
The African Union (“AU”) is one of the loudest critics of the ICC and
its disproportionate indictments. The African Union was launched in July
8
2002 with the goal of “realis[ing] Africa’s potential” by focusing on the
“cooperation and integration of African states to drive Africa’s growth and
9
economic development.” The AU—comprised of all of the African states
recognized by the United Nations (“UN”), along with the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic—lists its goals as:
Defend[ing] the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence
of its Member States; . . . promot[ing] and defend[ing] African
common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its
peoples; encourage[ing] international cooperation; promot[ing]
peace, security, and stability on the continent; promot[ing]
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and
good governance; [and] promot[ing] and protect[ing] human and
10
peoples’ rights in accordance with . . . human rights instruments.
With these goals in mind, the African Union has come to see the ICC’s
prosecutions of African heads of state as undermining the growth and
11
stability it is trying to achieve. Its claims that the ICC acts as a tool to
promote Western influence over Africa and Africans stem from the belief
that the ICC’s work is prejudiced and that the Court undermines the
advances that had been made, and that are being made, by Africans in ways
12
that are similar to the “scramble for Africa” formalized at the Berlin
13
Conference in 1884.

7.
Id.
8.
AFRICAN UNION, About the African Union, https://au.int/en/overview (last visited
Dec. 17, 2019).
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
th
11.
African Union Assembly, 13 Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/
Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, ¶ 3 (July 3, 2009).
12.
The “scramble for Africa” was the occupation, division, and colonization of
African territory by European powers from 1881 to 1914, culminating in the Berlin
conference. See Patrick Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of
the Dark Continent, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 166 (1985) (containing an in-depth discussion on
the Berlin Conference and the scramble for Africa).
13.
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in Africa?,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2013/10/17/canthe-international-criminal-court-play-fair-in-africa; Marisa O’Toole, Africa and the International
Criminal Court: Behind the Backlash and Toward Future Solutions, BOWDOIN DIGITAL
COMMONS 1, 18–21 (2017); Rowland J. V. Cole, Africa’s Relationship with the International
Criminal Court: More Political Than Legal, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 670 (2013).

Spring 2020]

Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC

197

Beginning when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese
14
President Omar al-Bashir in 2009, these claims of prejudice have soured
15
the once congenial relationship between the AU and the ICC. Since that
time, the ICC has issued indictments against at least twenty-one other
16
Africans and has investigated at least six situations in African countries.
The AU vehemently opposed some of these indictments on the grounds that
17
they violate the sovereign immunity that state leaders hold. Consequently,
the ICC’s decisions to continue pursuing these indictments led the AU to
call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC’s founding treaty,
18
the Rome Statute. The AU’s position has been met with both support and
19
contempt.
This note examines the ICC’s treatment of sovereign immunity,
specifically through the indictments of al-Bashir and Kenya’s President
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. These three
indictments have drawn particular criticism from the AU for violating the
20
principle of sovereign immunity. Through the lens of these indictments,
this note concludes that the ICC’s tendency to ignore sovereign immunity—
perhaps as a result of the Court’s close relationship with the UNSC—does
little to help it gain legitimacy in Africa and in the wider world and, more
than anything, undermines the noble work encoded in the ICC’s mandate.
To show this, the note first delves into the background of the two
organizations (the AU and the ICC) and the relationship they had prior to alBashir’s first indictment (Part I). It then examines the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and how the ICC has managed to make the defense nugatory for
both States Parties and non-State Parties (Part II). Next, this note looks at
the current relationship between the two organizations and how the
breakdown in their relationship caused by the ICC’s treatment of sovereign
14.
Abel S. Knottnerus, The AU, the ICC, and the Prosecution of African Presidents, in
AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 154 (Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016);
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal
Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 385,
386–87 (2013).
15.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152–53. See also Cole, supra note 13, at 671.
16.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Cases, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases (last visited Dec. 17,
2019). To date, the ICC has publicly indicted forty-four people. Id. Twenty-one of those
people are African and were indicted after al-Bashir. Id. Since al-Bashir’s indictment, the ICC
has investigated situations in seven countries, six of which are African countries. Id. Those
countries are Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Burundi.
Id.
17.
African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013).
18.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 107–08.
19.
See Aoife F. Martin, Note, Stop Letting Them Get Away with Murder: The Need to
Limit the Use of Head of State Immunity as a Defense for War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 923, 938–39 (2015).
20.
Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 388–89; INT’L CRIM. CT., Darfur, Sudan: Situation in
Darfur, Sudan ICC-02/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
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immunity has delegitimized the ICC, at least in Africa (Part III). Lastly, this
paper presents the AU’s response to the legitimacy crisis and proposes
solutions for the ICC that would see the Court sever (or lessen) its
relationship with the UNSC, adopt transparency measures that would help it
return to the initial principles that brought African nations on board in the
first place, and integrates aspect of legal (and cultural) institutions from the
countries it investigates to help create a sense of cooperation between the
Court and the nations it serves (Part IV).

I. History of the International Criminal Court
and the African Union
The creation of the ICC was lauded as “a gift of hope to future
generations and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human
21
rights and the rule of law.” The Court was created on July 17, 1998, when
120 states adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the
“Rome Statute” or the “Statute”). The Rome Statute entered into force on
22
July 1, 2002 after ratification by sixty countries. The ICC’s primary
function is to prosecute individuals for four international crimes: genocide,
23
war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity. These
crimes are seen as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
24
community as a whole[, which] must not go unpunished.”
The AU’s relationship with the ICC began amicably. Indeed, African
states and organizations were among the first proponents of the creation of
25
the Court. In addition, African lawyers and human rights campaigners
made significant contributions during campaigns for the creation of the
26
International Criminal Court. Africa’s support for the ICC originated from
the belief that the Court would help to uphold the rule of law when it came
to the abuses and aggressive actions of more powerful states and would give
African States Parties a more prominent position within international
27
society. For African states, the ICC was to be the bastion of justice that
brought an end to the impunity that other, more powerful, states had
28
flaunted.

21.
U.N. Secretary General, Secretary-General Says Establishment of International
Criminal Court Is Major Step in March Towards Universal Human Rights, Rule of Law, U.N.
PRESS RELEASE L/2890 (July 20, 1998).
22.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, About, supra note 1. On April 11, 2002 sixty-six states
ratified the Rome Statute–surpassing the sixty-state ratification threshold–allowing the
Court’s temporal jurisdiction to begin on July 1, 2002.
23.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
24.
Id.
25.
Ssenyonjo supra note 14, at 385–86.
26.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 108.
27.
Id. at 107.
28.
Id.
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On February 2, 1999, Senegal was the first state to ratify the Rome
Statute, followed soon after by Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
29
Burundi, and the Central African Republic. Currently, thirty-four African
states, or two-thirds of all AU Member States, are represented among the
30
States Parties to the Rome Statute. This makes Africa the largest regional
bloc represented in the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties and “underscores
31
the stakes in the present crisis of Africa-ICC relations.”
The breakdown in camaraderie between the AU and the ICC began with
32
the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. The relationship
worsened after the ICC issued arrest warrants for Kenyan heads of state
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, and it continues to deteriorate today
because of what the AU sees as the Court’s continued bias in pursuit of
33
African heads of state. In particular, the AU argues that the numerous and
unabating prosecutions of Africans have created issues of “prosecution
versus peace; arrest versus immunity; and trial [participation] versus
34
presidential responsibilities.” The AU sees the ICC’s indictment and
prosecution of African leaders as both hypocritical and a threat to the
stability and sovereignty that heads of state are granted through customary
35
international law. As a result, the AU has chosen to adopt a policy of
36
obstruction towards the ICC.

A. The Prosecution of Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir
In 2009, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC issued an initial arrest warrant
37
for al-Bashir for war crimes committed since 2003 in the Darfur region.
The case was referred to the ICC by the UNSC in 2005, under Resolution
38
1593. The ICC issued this arrest warrant with the intention of bringing
justice to victims of the genocide and curbing the impunity that al-Bashir
39
had enjoyed since the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur. The Court
issued a second arrest warrant in 2010, which added three additional charges

29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Ssenyonjo supra note 14, at 385–91.
33.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 108–09.
34.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 153.
35.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 108; Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152.
36.
Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 386–87.
37.
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 223–36
(Mar. 4, 2009). On 14 July 2008, the ICC’s Prosecutor filed ten charges of war crimes against
al-Bashir, including three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of
murder. Id.
38.
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
39.
Id.
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40

for genocide. That arrest warrant alleged that al-Bashir masterminded and
implemented plans to annihilate three Sudanese ethnic groups—the Fur,
41
Masalit, and Zaghawa—through murder, rape, and deportation.
However, some members of the AU did not see the arrest warrants as a
42
means for bringing justice to the region. Instead, they decried what they
saw as an injustice against the sitting head of a state that was not party to the
43
ICC’s governing Rome Statute. Former Libyan President and then AU
44
Chairman Muammar Gaddafi described al-Bashir’s indictment as a form
of terrorism instigated by the First World and as an effort “by [Western
45
states] to recolonize their former colonies.” Arab and African leaders also
saw al-Bashir’s arrest warrant as a way to undermine the “unity and
46
stability” that Sudan had developed under al-Bashir’s reign.
Since the issuance of the arrest warrant, al-Bashir has traveled to and
47
from countries both inside and outside of Africa with impunity. After the
thirteenth African Union Summit in 2009, the AU released a declaration
stating that the members of the Union would “not co-operate pursuant to the
provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to
immunities for the arrest and surrender of Sudanese President Omar al48
Bashir to the ICC.” Soon afterward, South African President Jacob Zuma
affirmed that his country would not extradite al-Bashir, and, true to his

40.
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest, at 8
(July 12, 2010).
41.
Id. at ¶ 8.
42.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 113–14.
43.
Id. While the Rome Statute does not expressly give the ICC jurisdiction over nonparties, the UNSC’s ability to refer cases to the ICC gives the Court de facto jurisdiction over
states that are parties to the UN Charter but not the Rome Statute. See infra Part II.
44.
Gaddafi’s morality is questionable (as he himself was a dictator against whom the
ICC would bring charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes in 2011), but, as one of
the founders of the African Union, its former Chairperson, and the loudest voice against alBashir’s indictments, his statements on the matter provide valuable insight into the reasons for
the deteriorating relationship between the AU and the ICC.
45.
Sudan Leader in Qatar for Summit, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2009), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7970892.stm.
46.
Arab Leaders Snub al-Bashir Warrant, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/03/2009330175846714662.html.
47.
Bashir Travel Map, BASHIR-WATCH, http://bashirwatch.org (last visited Dec. 17,
2019). Since the issuance of the first arrest warrant against him, al-Bashir has travelled outside
of the African continent to India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
th
48.
African Union Assembly, 13 Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/
Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, ¶ 10 (July 3, 2009); Bathandwa Mbola, AU leaders will not Extradite Al
Bashir, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY (July 6, 2009), http://www.
sanews.gov.za/south-africa/au-leaders-will-not-extradite-al-bashir.

Spring 2020]

Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC

201

word, he refused to do so when al-Bashir visited South Africa in 2015—in
49
contravention of the Court’s order.
Before his visit to South Africa in 2015, al-Bashir’s most notable visits
50
within the African continent were to Chad and Kenya in 2010. In July
2010, al-Bashir visited Chad to attend the Summit of the Sahel-Saharan
51
States. At the time of al-Bashir’s visit, Chad’s Interior and Security
minister stated, “We are not obliged to arrest Omar Hassan al-Bashir[.]
Bashir is a sitting president. I have never seen a sitting president arrested on
52
his travels by the host country.” Chad’s decision not to arrest al-Bashir
made it the first State Party to the Rome Statute to harbor “knowingly and
53
willingly[,] a fugitive . . . wanted by the Court.”
The Republic of Kenya also hosted President al-Bashir in August 2010,
54
inviting him to celebrate the signing of Kenya’s new constitution. In
response to allegations that Kenya was flouting article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute, the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs explained his government’s
refusal to execute the arrest warrant by noting his country’s “competing
obligations toward the Court, the African Union, and regional peace and
55
stability.”
The international community vehemently criticized Chad and Kenya for
not acquiescing to the ICC’s demand to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the
56
Court. For instance, the international non-profit human rights organization
49.
Wendell Roelf, South African President Defends Failure to Arrest Sudan’s
Bashir, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-bashiridUSKCN0QB1S520150806.
50.
Tom White, States ‘Failing to Seize Sudan’s Dictator Despite Genocide Charge’,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/
21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant; Xan Rice, Chad Refuses to
Arrest Omar al-Bashir on Genocide Charges, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir. The notoriety of these
two visits stemmed from how soon after the issuance of the second arrest warrant al-Bashir
was welcomed into each country; the first of these two trips, to Chad, was on July, 22, 2010,
just a week after the second arrest warrant was issued, while al-Bashir’s trip to Kenya was
only a month later on August 27, 2010.
51.
Rice, supra note 50.
52.
Id.
53.
Chad: Hosting Once Again President al-Bashir Would Be a Further Insult to the
Victims of Darfur, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/
Chad-should-stand-justice-and-not-grant-impunity-President-al-Bashir.html-0.
54.
Kenya Defends Failure to Arrest Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir in Nairobi,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/29/kenyaomar-al-bashir-arrest-failure.
55.
Press Release, Assembly of States Parties, President of the Assembly of States
Parties Meets Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, ICC Press Release ICC-ASP-20100921PR575 (Sept. 21, 2010).
56.
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Sudan Leader Travels Despite Warrant, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/africa/28sudan.html; Chad Failed to
Arrest Sudanese President, ICC Tells Security Council, UN NEWS, (Dec. 13, 2011), https://
news.un.org/en/story/2011/12/398212-chad-failed-arrest-sudanese-president-icc-tells-security-
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No Peace Without Justice criticized Chad’s decision and subsequent
inaction because “[a]s a State Party to the Rome Statute of the [ICC], Chad
is obliged to arrest any person against whom the Court had issued an arrest
57
warrant.”

B. Prosecution of Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto
In 2010, the ICC issued individual arrest warrants for Kenyan President
58
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. The warrants
accused Kenyatta and Ruto of crimes against humanity during the post59
election violence in 2007 and 2008 and were issued through the
60
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.
Because Kenya was a party to the Rome Statute, the AU could not
argue that Kenyatta and Ruto were immune to prosecution by the ICC as
heads of a state not party to the Rome Statute, as it did in al-Bashir’s case.
Nevertheless, it argued that Kenyatta and Ruto were immune from
council; Kenya Refuses to Arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, (Aug. 27, 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/08/kenia-seniega-detener-presidente-sudanes; Resolution on Kenya: Failure to Arrest President Omar alBashir, Eur. Parl. Doc P7_TA-PROV(2010)0315, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/201009/20100917ATT82761/20100917ATT82761EN.pdf.
57.
Alison Smith, NPWJ Calls on ICC and States Parties to Respond Strongly to
Chad’s Failure to Arrest President Bashir of Sudan, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, (Jul. 24,
2010), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/NPWJ-calls-ICC-and-States-Parties-respond-strongly-Chad%
E2%80%99s-failure-arrest-President-Bashir-Sudan.
58.
At the time of the indictment, Kenyatta was Deputy Prime Minister and the
Minister of Finance and Ruto was the Minister of Higher Education, Science, and
Technology. Kenyatta and Ruto were two of six suspects named by the ICC Prosecutor as
being responsible for planning and funding violence associated with the 2007–2008 Kenyan
Crisis, but they were the only people indicted. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/0902/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. 01/09-01/11, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23,
2012). Despite the indictments, the national awareness of these indictments, and a failed
petition to bar them from running in the elections because of the indictments, Kenyatta and
Ruto won the 2013 presidential election, becoming President and Deputy President
respectively. Paul Ogemba, Uhuru, Ruto Get Green Light to Run for State House, DAILY
NATION, (Feb. 16, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20130327004140/http://elections.
nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-Ruto-get-green-light-to-run-for-State-House-/-/1631868/1695520/-/
146x14c/-/index.html; Sudarsan Raghavan, Kenyatta Wins Kenya Presidential Election by
Narrow Margin, WASH. POST, (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/
kenyatta-wins-kenya-presidential-election-by-narrow-margin/2013/03/09/c07ae7fa-88b111e2-9d71-f0feafdd1394_story.html.
59.
Specifically, deportation, inhumane acts, murder, persecution, and rape. Prosecutor
v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 and Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. 01/09-01/11, supra
note 58.
60.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Kenya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last visited Dec.
17, 2019). Actions ex proprio motu are actions “of one’s own accord.” Ex propio motu,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014). The ICC Prosecutor’s ex propio motu powers
are granted by article 15 of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.
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61

prosecution while they held office. On October 12, 2013, the African
Union convened an Extraordinary Summit to discuss the AU’s relationship
62
with the ICC. There, the AU Assembly, the highest decision-making body
of the AU, decided “[t]hat no charges shall be commenced or continued
before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of
State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity
63
during their term of office.” It then demanded “[t]hat the trials of President
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto, who are the
current serving leaders of the Republic of Kenya, [] be suspended until they
64
complete their terms in office.” The AU also claimed that since Kenya had
such a large role to play in maintaining peace in the Darfur region, arresting
Kenyatta and Ruto would only serve to undermine, and even upheave,
65
related efforts. Ultimately, the ICC Prosecutor dropped the charges against
66
Kenyatta and Ruto because of witness intimidation.
The Extraordinary Summit also served as an opportunity for some
members of the AU to call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the
67
ICC and the Rome Statute, with the loudest voices coming from Kenya,
61.
Knottnerus, supra note 14. Sovereign immunity will be discussed in Part II, infra.
62.
African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013).
63.
AFRICAN UNION, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 46A bis, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/
36398-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_
african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf [hereinafter Malabo Protocol].
64.
Id. at ¶ 10(i)–(ii).
65.
Knottnerus supra note 14, at 154.
66.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of
Charges (Dec. 5, 2014); Kenya: Official Apology for Past Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/africa/kenya-official-apology-for-pastwrongs.html.
67.
Article 127 of the Rome Statute allows for states to withdraw from the agreement.
The article states:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect
one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies
a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations
arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial
obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any
cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and
which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any
matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on
which the withdrawal became effective.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 127.
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Sudan, Rwanda, Namibia, Chad, Uganda, and Ethiopia. In large part due
to a lack of broader Assembly support for such a drastic measure, these calls
69
did not result in a mass exodus from the ICC. So far, Burundi is the only
70
African nation that has successfully withdrawn from the ICC. Although
Gambia and South Africa initially wished to withdraw from the ICC and the
71
Rome Statute, they have since withdrawn their notices of intent to leave.
(Gambia justified its initial decision to leave as “warranted by the fact that
the ICC, despite being called the International Criminal Court, is in fact an
International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people
72
of colour, especially Africans.” South Africa, meanwhile, cited a “conflict
of the ICC’s Rome Statute with its domestic laws that grant leaders
73
diplomatic immunity.” )
Similarly, while Kenya indicated a desire to withdraw from the ICC, it
has not done so. In response to the ICC’s warrants, which it perceived as the
ICC’s attempt to meddle in its internal affairs, the Kenyan Parliament
passed a nonbinding motion asking the government to “withdraw from the
68.
African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013); See African Union, Withdrawal Strategy
Document (Draft 2) (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Withdrawal Strategy Document],
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/
icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf.
69.
Anthony Wang, On the Failed Authority of the International Criminal Court, INT’L
POLICY DIGEST (Jun. 15, 2018), https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authorityof-the-international-criminal-court.
70.
Burundi First to Leave International Criminal Court, AL JAZEERA, (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/burundi-leave-international-criminal-court171027080533712.html. Burundi’s decision is believed to have been precipitated by the
Prosecutor’s “decision to investigate atrocities meted on civilians and human rights
violation[s] [in Burundi between 2015 and 2017 arising from] political violence.” See Bob
Koigi, Future of ICC in Doubt After African Countries Withdraw, EURACTIV (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/future-of-icc-in-doubt-after-africancountries-withdraw; Toby Sterling & Katharine Houreld, Burundi Rejects International
Criminal Court War Crimes Investigation, REUTERS, (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-burundi/burundi-rejects-international-criminal-court-warcrimes-investigation-idUSKBN1DA1IH.
In 2019, the Philippines also officially withdrew from the Rome Statute, thereby ending its
official association with the ICC. See Philippines Officially Out of the International Criminal
Court, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/philippinesofficially-international-criminal-court-190317171005619.html.
71.
Gambia’s notice of withdrawal was rescinded after a new government took office.
South Africa’s was rescinded after the High Court of South Africa ruled that the notice was
illegal under domestic law because it required parliamentary approval, which was not sought.
Elise Keppler, Gambia Rejoins ICC, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2017/02/17/gambia-rejoins-icc; South Africa’s Decision to Leave ICC Ruled
‘Invalid’, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39050408.
72.
Joe Bavier, Gambia Announces Withdrawal from International Criminal Court,
REUTERS, (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-icc/gambia-announceswithdrawal-from-international-criminal-court-idUSKCN12P335.
73.
Koigi, supra note 70.
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Rome Statute and repeal the International Crimes Act.” However, the
government did not comply, and Kenya, like Gambia and South Africa,
remains a State Party to the Rome Statute.

II. Sovereign Immunity’s Role at the ICC
One of the AU’s main grievances with the ICC concerns the Court’s
ability to prosecute sitting heads of state, like al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and
75
Ruto. In particular, the AU argues that the ICC’s attempt to exercise
jurisdiction over these three men violated the doctrine of sovereign
76
immunity. In other words, according to the AU, al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and
Ruto are (or were) immune from prosecution by virtue of their roles as
77
sitting heads of state for their respective countries. Contrary to the AU’s
assertion, though it is true that all three men hold some immunity because of
their positions, sitting heads of state do not possess absolute immunity
78
simply because they currently hold office.

A. Head of State Immunity Generally
Heads of state, whether current or former, used to enjoy absolute
immunity. The development of international law and the emergence of new
79
customs, however, has led to the erosion of this form of immunity. As a
result, under the current theory of “restrictive immunity,” heads of state can
be prosecuted for certain acts that are deemed egregious, such as war crimes

74.
Firew Tiba, The Prosecution of Sitting Heads of State by the International Criminal
Court, 21 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 134, 144 (2013).
75.
In al-Bashir’s case, this is further complicated by the fact that Sudan is neither a
signatory nor a Party to the Rome Statute, as mentioned above.
th
76.
See African Union Assembly, 18 Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/
AU/Dec.397(XVIII), ¶6 (Jan. 30, 2012); African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess.,
Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Dec.1, ¶4 (Oct. 2013).
77.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152. It should be noted that al-Bashir was ousted from
his role as head of state on April 11, 2019 by a coup. Ousted Sudanese President al-Bashir
Moved to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/world/
africa/omar-bashir-prison.html. Kenyatta and Ruto are still the incumbent President and
Deputy President of Kenya. THE PRESIDENCY, Executive Office of the President,
http://www.president.go.ke/presidency (last visited Dec. 17, 2019); THE PRESIDENCY, Office
of the Deputy President, http://www.president.go.ke/office-of-the-deputy-president (last visited
Dec. 17, 2019).
78.
See, e.g., JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 89–96 (2014); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY 686 (2d ed. 2008); RAMONA PEDRETTI, IMMUNITY OF HEADS OF STATE AND
STATE OFFICIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 13 (2015); ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE
IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008).
79.
Guénaël Mettraux, et al., Heads of State Immunities, International Crimes and
President Bashir’s Visit to South Africa, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 577, 583 (2018).
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and crimes against humanity. One rationale behind the move towards a
restricted standard of sovereign immunity is that the “[a]bsolute immunity
theory does not differentiate between civil or criminal actions, and thus
provides little recourse for those seeking justice, even if they are seeking it
81
for the most grave human rights violations.” In contrast, the restrictive
immunity theory ensures that the defense of immunity can never shield
human rights violators, thereby allowing for prosecution of perpetrators and
82
justice for victims.
The arrest of General Augusto Pinochet by the United Kingdom in 1998
is arguably the most salient indication that the norms of international law
have shifted from absolute immunity to a more restrictive view of sovereign
immunity. In 1973, Pinochet led a coup d’etat that ousted the then-President
83
of Chile, Salvador Allende. The violent aftermath of the coup led to
84
human rights violations for which he was indicted by a Spanish court in
85
1998. Six days after the court’s indictment, he was arrested in London and
held there on charges of genocide, torture, hostage-taking, and large-scale
86
murder. During a hearing held in London to dismiss the arrest warrant
issued by the Spanish court, Pinochet claimed immunity under the United
87
Kingdom’s State Immunity Act of 1978 as a former head of state. The
House of Lords, however, rejected his defense. It invoked the principle of
universal jurisdiction, by which any state apprehending an alleged
perpetrator is deemed competent to exercise its jurisdiction, and decreed
that international crimes such as torture could not be protected by former88
head-of-state immunity. Pinochet’s arrest marked the first time a nation
used the principle of universal jurisdiction to arrest a foreign head of state
89
for crimes that had been committed in that leader’s country. Thus, though

80.
Martin supra note 19, at 924.
81.
Id. at 928.
82.
Id. at 929.
83.
See generally, PETER KORNBLUTH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER
OF ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2d ed. 2013).
84.
Pinochet’s regime was responsible for various human rights abuses during its reign,
including forced disappearances, murder, and the torture of political opponents. Monte Reel &
J.Y. Smith, A Chilean Dictator’s Dark Legacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/10/AR2006121000302.html.
85.
Pinochet Arrested in London, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 17, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/195413.stm.
86.
Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 237, 277 (1999).
87.
Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the
Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1596 (2000).
88.
Id. at 1598. This decision was overturned because of concerns about the
impartiality of one of the judges but was later affirmed by a second panel.
89.
How General Pinochet’s Detention Changed the Meaning of Justice, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/howgeneral-pinochets-detention-changed-meaning-justice. Universal jurisdiction is an international
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Pinochet died before being convicted, his trial exemplified the increasing
willingness of countries to hold foreign heads of state accountable for their
90
actions, notwithstanding claims of sovereign immunity. Moreover, it
showed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction could be triggered by an
individual’s participation in genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, and
91
war crimes.
The arrest and trial of former Yugoslavian President Slobodan
Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(the “tribunal” or the “ICTY”) further demonstrates the move towards the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The ICTY indicted Milosevic in
1999 for crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo War and, a
year later, added additional charges for violating the laws or customs of war,
breaching the Geneva Conventions in Croatia and Bosnia, and committing
92
genocide in Bosnia. Milosevic’s trial, which lasted from 2002 until his
death in 2006, was the first by an international tribunal of a sitting head of
state for state-sanctioned criminal activities and violations of human rights
93
law.
Notably, Milosevic did not raise the defense of sovereign immunity.
Some scholars argue that Milosevic did not raise the defense because
“traditional notions of sovereign immunity [were already] disappearing in
international law” and that, therefore, the defense would have served little to
94
no purpose to his case.
Evidence of the disappearance of traditional notions of sovereign
immunity from international law can be found in the ICTY’s founding
statute, the 1993 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
legal principle that reasons that certain activities are so reprehensible that the usual rules of
jurisdiction are waived, and any state apprehending the alleged perpetrator is deemed
competent to exercise its jurisdiction. VALERIE EPPS & LORIE GRAHAM, EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 2015).
90.
Martin, supra note 19, at 923.
91.
Sison, supra note 87, at 1583–84.
92.
See Case No. IT-02-54, Slobodan Milosevic: Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia, Case
Information Sheet, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia) (an unofficial document
detailing indictments against Milosevic including: genocide; complicity in genocide;
deportation; murder; persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; inhumane acts/
forcible transfer; extermination; imprisonment; torture; willful killing; unlawful confinement;
willfully causing great suffering; unlawful deportation or transfer; extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly; cruel treatment; plunder of public or private property; attacks on civilians;
destruction or willful damage done to historic monuments and institutions dedicated to
education or religion; unlawful attacks on civilian objects).
93.
Tiba, supra note 74, at 136; Christina Amanpour et al., Milosevic Indictment Makes
History, CNN, (May 27, 1999), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/27/kosovo.
milosevic.04.
94.
Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State
Immunity and the Specter of Victor’s Justice, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355, 365 (2004).
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Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The
statute gave the tribunal the power to prosecute “[a] person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided” in the international
95
crimes committed during the Kosovo War. This power explicitly extended
to the prosecution of sovereigns, as the statute further provided that “the
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government[,] . . . shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
96
nor mitigate punishment.”
Though the statute creating the ICTY dismissed the notion of universal
jurisdiction, the tribunal instead justified its unrestricted access to
Milosevic—despite his role as a sitting head of state—as well as to his
97
deputies, through the doctrine of primacy. This access changed the
landscape of sovereign immunity in international law, establishing
precedent for the prosecution of crimes against humanity carried out by
state actors.

B. Sovereign Immunity and the ICC
Both the Pinochet and Milosevic indictments and arrests altered the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and provided a basis for the ICC’s own
method of sidestepping head-of-state immunity. However, the Court’s
relationship with sovereign immunity is more similar to that of the ICTY (as
used in its indictment and prosecution of Milosevic), than to the universal
98
jurisdiction that was used in Pinochet’s case.
The text of the Rome Statute is similar to the text of the ICTY’s
founding statute. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that
the defense of sovereign immunity does not bar the ICC from exercising
jurisdiction over persons who are or were heads of state:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
99
reduction of sentence.
Moreover, the plain language of article 27(2) of the statute clearly
indicates that head of state immunity is not a valid defense at the ICC:

95.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Res. 827, art. 7(1)
(May 25, 1993) (amended July 7, 2009 by Res. 1877).
96.
Id. art. 7(2).
97.
Tiba, supra note 74, at 138.
98.
Id. at 142.
99.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27(1).
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Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
100
jurisdiction over such a person.
Notably, article 27 makes no distinction between states that are party to
the Agreement and those that are not, and it thus bars the immunity defense
101
for all individuals brought before the Court. Article 27’s ability to negate
the head-of-state defense for States is therefore an example of the more
restrictive standard for sovereign immunity which, as stated above, prevents
102
the defense from being used to shield human rights violators. By
employing the restrictive standard, the Court has an avenue through which it
can accomplish its mandate of securing justice for victims of human rights
violations across the globe.
Article 13(b) further supplements article 27’s ability to strip head-ofstate immunity, and even extends the statute’s applicability to non-party
states. Article 13(b) denotes the UNSC’s ability to refer cases to the ICC
Prosecutor and states that the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over a crime
if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
103
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations[.]”
104
As it currently stands, there are 194 signatories to the United Nations.
Chapter VII of the Charter states that all 194 signatories are legally bound to
the resolutions passed by the UNSC; this includes resolutions
recommending that the ICC Prosecutor bring charges against a head of
105
state. It has been posited that by signing the Charter, each State has
implicitly waived the head-of-state defense in situations where the ICC
brings charges based on the recommendation of the UNSC, regardless of
106
whether the party is a signatory to the Rome Statute. This argument
suggests that the UNSC has universal jurisdiction, which allows it to bypass

100.
Id. art 27(2).
101.
Id. While article 27 makes no distinction between States that are party to the Statute
and those that are not, it is widely accepted that it only applies to States that are party to the
Statute based on the rules established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. But
see Sophie Papillon, Has the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir’s
Immunity, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 275, 284 (2010) (discussing article 27’s application to nonparty states and the UNSC’s ability to implicitly remove head of state immunity more
generally).
102.
Martin, supra note 19, at 929–30.
103.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
104.
UNITED NATIONS, Overview, https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/
index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
105.
U.N. Charter ch. V, art. 25.
106.
Papillon, supra note 101, at 280.
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head-of-state immunity when necessary to prosecute international crimes.
Thus, taken together, articles 27 and 13(b) arguably give the ICC wide
latitude to exercise jurisdiction over countries that are not party to its
founding statute.
Nevertheless, while the Court does not recognize sovereign immunity
as a defense, it does acknowledge that heads of state have certain other
privileges of diplomatic immunity that may limit the Court’s ability to
108
apprehend them. Because the ICC lacks a police force, it does not have
the ability to arrest individuals it charges, and it instead relies on States
Parties to assist it in the apprehension and extradition of individuals wanted
109
by the Court. However, the Rome Statute recognizes that there are limits
110
to States Parties’ ability to assist in this way. Article 98(1) of the Statute
speaks to the Court’s limitations with respect to States Parties’ obligations
111
in assisting with the apprehension of defendants from third-party states.
The text states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or
assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
112
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
In directing the ICC not to proceed with a request for arrest in
circumstances where a State Party and a third state are involved, article
98(1) respects the doctrine of diplomatic immunity and ensures States
Parties are not forced to balance competing legal obligations to the ICC and
113
to other states.
The AU applied article 98(1) to the ICC’s requests to have al-Bashir
arrested upon his arrival in countries that were States Parties. Like they did
when the indictment was first announced, the AU argued that because al107.
Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and Universal
Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter, 56 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 49, 50–51 (2007) (arguing that
referrals from the UNSC are the only instance in which the Court exercises universal
jurisdiction).
108.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98.
109.
COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 10 Ways States Can Support the ICC and
Global Justice, http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/10-ways-states-can-support-icc-and-globaljustice (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
110.
Papillon, supra note 101, at 285.
111.
But see Johan D. van der Vyver, Note, Prosecuting the President of Sudan: A
Dispute Between the African Union and the International Criminal Court, 11 AFR. HUM. RTS.
L.J. 683, 683–84 (2011) (arguing otherwise and stating instead that article 98(2) contradicts
article 27(2)).
112.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98(1).
113.
Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 421 (2004).
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Bashir was the current head of a third-party state who enjoyed diplomatic
immunity, African States Parties could not be required to arrest and
114
surrender him to the ICC without Sudan’s approval.
The AU’s notion that al-Bashir could not be apprehended and
surrendered to the Court was challenged in a hearing before the Court’s Pre115
Trial Chamber (“PTC”). The PTC concluded that al-Bashir was not
entitled to immunity because the UNSC had referred the situation in Sudan
116
to the ICC, as allowed by article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, by calling on
the parties involved in the conflict in Darfur to co-operate in bringing al117
Bashir to justice. Moreover, the PTC determined that al-Bashir held no
immunity because of the implicit waiver that accompanies being a signatory
118
to the UN Charter : Sudan, as a UN Member State, was obligated to abide
by the UNSC’s Resolution to surrender al-Bashir despite the fact that it was
neither a signatory nor a Party to the Rome Statute. The PTC also concluded
that States Parties, both in that role and as UN Member States, must abide
119
by the UNSC’s Resolution. For better or for worse, the PTC’s rejection of
the AU’s article 98(1) defense and its liberal reading of articles 13(b) and 27
give the ICC access to the UNSC’s universal jurisdiction. Consequently,
sitting heads of state who are alleged to have committed international
crimes have few opportunities to avoid prosecution.

III. The Delegitimization of the ICC
The ICC was created in order to deliver justice for the most heinous
120
international crimes when national court systems are unable to do so.
Despite the Court’s noble and admirable mission, it has always faced issues
of legitimacy stemming primarily from how it handles sovereign

114.
van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 685 (noting that Denmark also used this
argument when it invited al-Bashir to Copenhagen).
115.
The Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) is one of three divisions of the ICC, the other two
being Trial and Appeals. The PTC is responsible for confirming or denying indictments.
Additionally, “[t]he judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber will issue a warrant of arrest if there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction and that the person will not appear voluntarily before the Court, will endanger the
proceedings or investigation, or will continue committing crimes if not arrested.” See INT’L
CRIM. CT., Pre-Trial Stage, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Pre-Trial.aspx (last visited Dec. 17,
2019).
116.
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 223–36
(Mar. 4, 2009).
117.
S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 38 at ¶2; van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 683–84.
118.
Id. at 684, 696–70.
119.
Id. at 696–70.
120.
Rome Statute, supra note 2; Human Rights Watch, Courting History: The
Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years, (July 11, 2008).
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121

immunity. In fact, one of the reasons the United States decided not to
become a Party to the Rome Statute was that the statute lacks “an effective
mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions of American servicemembers
122
and officials.” The U.S. rationale overlaps with two of the AU’s biggest
concerns with the court: (1) that there is no immunity for sitting officials
(discussed above in Part II) and (2) that the Court, as an institution, can be
123
easily politicized (discussed here in Part III). The AU’s almost decadelong campaign against the ICC has only bolstered its concerns and has
served to further undermine the Court’s legitimacy, particularly among
124
smaller or weaker states. If the beliefs and sentiments underlying the
tenuous relationship between the ICC and the AU persist, the Court’s
legitimacy may be even further undermined.
Allegations of ICC politicization come on the back of years of Western
intervention in Africa, and the AU argues that the Court exists as a tool for
125
the neo-colonialism and imperialism of more powerful Western countries.
This argument has the power to delegitimize the Court by giving the
appearance that the Court is no longer seeking justice based on a legal
mandate but is instead politically motivated. This argument has mixed
support. On the one hand, the Court was designed to exist outside of the
racial hierarchies that were created centuries ago through slavery, servitude,
126
and colonialism.
Many of the Court’s supporters, including the
International Development Law Organization’s Advisory Board Chairman,
Professor Makau W. Mutua, and Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
127
believe the Court has managed to do so. For example, Chairman Mutua
128
once said it was preposterous to accuse the ICC of racial hypocrisy, while
Secretary General Annan made it known on multiple occasions that he
129
believed the Court was not biased against Africans.

121.
Madeline Morris, The Jurisdiction of The International Criminal Court over
Nationals of Non-Party States (Conference Remarks), 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 363, 363
(1999).
122.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty, Release
No. 233-02 (May 6, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3337.
123.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 110–13.
124.
Id. at 111.
125.
Id. at 112; see Hiroyuki Tosa, Global Constitutional Order and the Deviant Other:
Reflections on the Dualistic Nature of the ICC Process, 18 INT’L REL. ASIA-PACIFIC 45, 57–
58 (2018).
126.
Tosa, supra note 125, at 64–66; see generally Preparatory Committee on
Establishment of International Criminal Court, Conflict Between Security Council Powers,
International Court, Discussed in Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. L/2777 (Apr. 4, 1996).
127.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 120.
128.
Id.
129.
Annan Defends International Criminal Court, NEWS24 (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.
news24.com/Africa/News/Annan-defends-International-Criminal-Court-20131007; “I Stand
by the ICC”, Kofi Annan Says, THIS IS AFRICA (Nov. 21, 2016), https://thisisafrica.me/standicc-kofi-annan-says; The International Criminal Court Is Not Biased Against Africans: Kofi

Spring 2020]

Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC

213

For many, though, it is difficult to believe that the ICC is not biased
130
when ten of the eleven cases currently being investigated are from Africa.
For instance, former Ethiopian Primer Minister Hailemariam Desalegn once
stated, “African leaders have come to a consensus that the [ICC’s] process
that has been conducted in Africa has a flaw. The intention was to avoid any
kind of impunity . . . but now the process has degenerated to some kind of
131
race hunting.” Kenyatta, who admittedly has his own biases against the
Court, has also made similar claims, stating, “[w]e would love nothing more
than to have an international forum for justice and accountability, but what
132
choice do we have when we get only bias and race-hunting at the ICC?”
Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town Desmond Tutu shared this sentiment,
stating, “[i]n a consistent world, those responsible for this suffering and loss
of life should be treading the same path as some of their African and Asian
133
peers who have been made to answer for their actions in the Hague.”
Desalegn’s, Kenyatta’s, and Tutu’s comments show that despite the
Court’s efforts—and Mutua’s and Annan’s words of support—it has failed
to function outside of global racial hierarchies. It has failed for two specific
reasons: first, because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of existing
outside of racial hierarchies as a multilateral organization; and second,
because of the Court’s relationship with the UNSC.

A. The ICC in the Context of Existing Global Systems
As a multilateral judicial organization, the ICC must navigate the global
systems—whether financial, political, or social—that existed before its
creation. Because of its position as an international institution for justice,
the Court is forced to interact with, and must consequently challenge, the
racism that is embedded in the international system of justice as a result of
134
the legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism. Admittedly, this is not
an easy task for the Court, but it is one that it must tackle—and tackle with
care—if the Court is to gain supporters and maintain its legitimacy in the

Annan Says, THIS IS AFRICA (June 22, 2016), https://thisisafrica.me/the-international-criminalcourt-is-not-biased-against-africans-kofi-annan-says.
130.
ICC Situations, supra note 4.
131.
Patryk I. Labuda, The International Criminal Court and Perceptions of
Sovereignty, Colonialism and Pan-African Solidarity, 20 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 289, 310 (2014).
132.
Uhuru Kenyatta, President of Kenya, Speech at the Extraordinary Session of Heads
of State and Government of the AU (Oct. 12, 2013), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/
2000095433/speech-by-president-uhuru-kenyatta-at-the-extraordinary-session-of-the-africanunion.
133.
Desmond Tutu Calls for Bush, Blair to Face Hague, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 2, 2012),
https://www.france24.com/en/20120902-desmond-tutu-calls-bush-blair-trial-hague-iraq-warweapons-mass-destruction-uk-usa.
134.
Tosa, supra note 125, at 57. The legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism is
particularly shown in the countries that are able to dominate the proceedings of the UNSC,
and thus the ICC, despite not being Parties to the Rome Statute. Id.
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global arena, especially in Africa. In a speech he made after al-Bashir’s
indictment, Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, stated:
Rwanda cannot be party to ICC for one simple reason . . . with [the]
ICC all the injustices of the past including colonialism,
imperialism, keep coming back in different forms. They control
you. As long as you are poor, weak there is always some rope to
hang you. ICC is made for Africans and poor countries. Two thirds
of the countries that have signed for this ICC are these poor
countries. When they were signing they didn’t know what they
were signing. They don’t know they were signing for a rope to
135
hang themselves.
Statements like these regarding the flawed and biased nature of the
Court sound in truth to many state leaders who collectively have the power
to undermine the Court’s legitimacy. As it stands, the Court’s actions in
Africa have only fueled the belief that when the Court acts against weaker
and poorer countries in Africa (and around the world), it does so for colonial
136
and imperialistic reasons on behalf of the West.

B. The UNSC’s Control over the ICC
The Court’s relationship with the UNSC serves as further troubling
proof that the West has some control over the Court’s actions. As seen in alBashir’s case, the UNSC has the ability to refer—and defer—cases to the
137
Court. The UNSC is comprised of fifteen members, five of which—the
United States, France, Britain, China, Russia—are permanent members with
138
the other ten being rotating members. As permanent members of the
UNSC, the United States, France, and Britain coordinated a referral of the
139
Darfur situation to the ICC.
UNSC members which are not party to the Rome Statute—like the
United States, China, and Russia—may still vote on whether the Court
140
should indict and try citizens of any country across the world. Unlike the

135.
Kezio-Musoke David, Kagame Tells Why He Is Against ICC Charging Bashir,
DAILY NATION (Aug. 3, 2008). Note that this author searched for an original transcript of
Kugame’s statement in vain. The Daily Nation’s version appears authoritative.
136.
See Tosa, supra note 125, at 55–56.
137.
van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 695–97.
138.
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, Members, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
content/security-council-members (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
139.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur,
Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31,
2005).
140.
Recall that in Part II above it was noted that the UNSC can pass resolutions that
bind all UN Member States. Currently, there are 193 recognized UN Member States, while
only 122 States are Party to the Rome Statute. See UNITED NATIONS, Growth in United
Nations Membership, 1945–Present, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-
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Court, the UNSC has a political mandate; most, if not all, of its actions are
141
politically motivated. The relationship between the Court and the UNSC
compromises the Court’s role as an organization that is independent and
142
outside the political realm. The UNSC’s influence over the Court allows it
to direct the Court’s power in order to exact “international justice” on
weaker, poorer countries that do not wield power in any international
143
forum.
This is extremely troubling, as three of the UNSC’s five
permanent members have not bound themselves legally to the Rome Statute
and the Court. For the weaker and poorer countries located in Africa, the
UNSC’s control over the ICC is simply another neo-colonial tool to
maintain the hierarchies that were set in place before, during, and after the
144
Scramble for Africa.
The unfettered access given to UNSC States that are not party to the
Rome Statute is an issue the Court must contend with, but it has yet to see
145
this entanglement as a problem. The current ICC Prosecutor, Fatou
Bensouda, has previously stated that the Court is “not a tool in the hands of
[Western] politicians who think they can decide when to plug or unplug
146
us.” So far, however, the UNSC has referred cases from just two countries
147
to the ICC—Sudan and Libya.

C. Responses to the Legitimacy Crisis and Impact on the ICC’s
Prosecutions of African Heads of State
African leaders have responded to the biased and neo-colonial nature of
the Court in various ways. For al-Bashir, that entails continuing to resist
arrest and extradition to the Hague when he visits other African states.
Despite the PTC’s ruling that Sudan should surrender al-Bashir and that UN
Member States should arrest and extradite him pursuant to the UNSC’s
resolution, al-Bashir has yet to be apprehended and his trial at the ICC has
yet to commence. In 2016, Quartz Africa reported that in the seven years he
had been wanted by the ICC for war crimes (from 2009 to 2016), al-Bashir
148
made seventy-four trips across the world. He continues his travels
united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, States Parties to
the
Rome
Statute,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
141.
Bethel Aregawi, The Politicisation of the International Criminal Court by United
Nations Security Council Referrals, ACCORD (July 21, 2017), https://www.accord.org.za/conflicttrends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nations-security-council-referrals.
142.
Id.
143.
Tosa, supra note 125, at 55–56.
144.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 120–21.
145.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 118–19.
146.
Id.
147.
ICC Situations, supra note 4.
148.
Sudan’s President Has Made 74 Trips Across the World in the Seven Years He’s
Been Wanted for War Crimes, QUARTZ AFRICA (Mar. 4, 2016), https://qz.com/africa/630571/
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unimpeded because African states, both those that are party to the Rome
149
Statute and those that are not, continue to defy the ICC’s ruling by
knowingly and willingly harboring a fugitive wanted by the Court.
With AU Member States flouting their legal obligations to the Court
and their moral responsibilities to the world, it is difficult to say whether alBashir will ever be apprehended and tried for the atrocities committed in the
Darfur region. This impedes the ICC’s ability to effectively carry out its
mandate. The ICC’s lack of a police force means the Court is wholly
dependent on states to implement its decisions, and the AU’s conscious
obstruction has hampered the Court’s ability to pursue justice for African
victims.
Unlike the al-Bashir case, the Kenyatta and Ruto matters have been
resolved. The AU opposed the ICC’s indictment of the Kenyans because
their continuous presence at the trials in the Hague—as required by article
150
63(1) —would have a “negative effect on the demanding responsibilities
151
of African presidents.” In order to prevent Kenyatta and Ruto from having
to confront conflicting obligations, the Kenyan government and the AU
took steps to terminate the cases, or at least to have them postponed while
152
the two were serving as President and Deputy President. The AU lobbied
to have Kenyatta and Ruto excused from constant presence during the
course of their trials and argued that they should be able to choose which
sessions of their trials to attend, so that they could still properly carry out
153
their elected roles.
In response, the Trial Chamber granted both Kenyatta and Ruto a
conditional excuse from their trials, departing from the general rule of
154
continuous presence in article 63(1). Explaining that Court judges have
the discretion to “excuse an accused on a case-by-case basis,” the Trial
Chamber excused Kenyatta and Ruto from all hearings except for opening
155
and closing statements and the delivery of the judgment. However, the
Appeals Chamber quickly reversed this ruling, deeming it “a blanket
excusal before the trial had even commenced, effectively making absence
156
the general rule and [their] presence an exception.” The Appeals Chamber
did agree that judges had discretion in deciding which hearings could be
sudans-president-has-made-74-trips-across-the-world-in-the-seven-years-hes-been-wanted-forwar-crimes.
149.
Since 2009, al-Bashir has made at least twenty-six trips outside of the African
continent to China, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
150.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 63(1) ( “The accused shall be present during the
trial.”).
151.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 165.
152.
Id. at 165–66.
153.
Id. at 165.
154.
Id. at 166.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
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missed, but absences must be limited to exceptional instances. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that Kenyatta and Ruto would not have to
159
attend all of their hearings but would still have to attend most.
In light of this outcome, Kenya and the AU turned to the ICC’s
160
Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) for recourse. The AU called on the
ASP to amend articles 27 and 63 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
161
(“RPE”). Consequently, the Assembly made three amendments to the
162
RPE’s rules on presence at trial. The first two amendments allow
defendants to appear at their hearings through the use of video technology
and allow the Trial Chamber to excuse defendants for reasons deemed
exceptional (as required by the Appeals Chamber). Additionally, the ASP
inserted new Rule 134 quater, which states that requests for excusal by
persons who are “mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties at the
highest national level” are to be granted under a number of circumstances,
163
including when it is in the interest of justice. The final amendment was
adopted to ensure that the Trial Chamber expeditiously considers requests
164
for excusal from defendants with extraordinary public duties.
The amendments to the RPE were undoubtedly victories for Kenya and
165
the AU, particularly the addition of Rule 134 quater. The rule effectively
reversed the Appeals Chamber’s ruling on Kenyatta and Ruto’s presence
166
during their trials. It “allows the absence of the accused to be the rule
157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 166–67.
159.
Id. at 167.
160.
The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) “is the Court’s management oversight and
legislative body and is composed of representatives of the States which have ratified or
acceded to the Rome Statute.” The ASP’s role is to provide management oversight to the
Presidency, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar regarding administration of the Court.
Additionally, the ASP adopts the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of
Crime. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp (last
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
161.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 166.
162.
Id. at 167 (noting that the amendments were Rules 134 bis, ter, and quarter). The
ASP did not make any amendments to the articles. Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 168.
165.
Id. at 168–69.
166.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, INT’L CRIM. CT., rule 134 (2013). Rule 134
quater allows for absence from trial proceedings in the Hague if the defendant has
extraordinary public duties to attend to. The text of Rule 134 quater states:
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill
extraordinary public duties at the highest national level may submit a written
request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel only;
the request must specify that the accused explicitly waives the right to be present at
the trial. 2. The Trial Chamber shall consider the request expeditiously and, if
alternative measures are inadequate, shall grant the request where it determines that
it is in the interests of justice and provided that the rights of the accused are fully
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rather than the exception and suggests that excusal decisions do not have to
be on a case-by-case basis or that the period of the excusal has to be limited
167
by what is strictly necessary.”
Soon afterward, Kenya and the AU scored additional victories. In 2014,
President Kenyatta kept an election promise by cooperating with the Court
168
to prove his innocence. To do so, he briefly handed over the reins to Ruto,
stepped down as President, and attended a hearing in the Hague in October
169
2014.
Nevertheless, shortly after his visit to the Court, Bensouda
announced she had withdrawn all charges against him because the
170
Government of Kenya had failed to cooperate with the Court. The
Prosecutor stated that the government had failed to turn over relevant
171
documents and had intimidated witnesses in Kenya. Sixteen months later,
172
the ICC dropped its charges against Ruto as well. Despite Bensouda’s
173
admonitions, Kenya and the AU claimed the dropped charges as victories.
In their view, this was proof that the ICC was a politicized and hypocritical
institution that only served as an ongoing threat to the stability and
174
sovereignty of African states. In its almost decade-long campaign against
the ICC, this proof was the AU’s biggest win yet.
In sum, African leaders have criticized the ICC for being hypocritical,
175
inconsistent, and a tool for neo-colonialism. Though many of these
176
accusations are self-serving, they hold some truth when considered within
the context of the ICC’s role as a multilateral, justice-seeking organization
working within historically racist structures and within the context of its
relationship with the UNSC. The ICC’s actions in Africa do not instill
confidence in the Court as the bastion for fairness and equality the continent
expected it to be. From the AU’s perspective, the indictments of al-Bashir,
Kenyatta, and Ruto demonstrate that the ICC has allowed itself to become
politicized by the same Western countries that refuse to accede to it and to
its founding treaty. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy as an apolitical,
ensured. The decision shall be taken with due regard to the subject matter of the
specific hearings in question and is subject to review at any time.
167.
Knottnerus, supra note 1415, at 168.
168.
Id. at 169.
169.
Id.
170.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of
Charges, ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 2014).
171.
INT’L CRIM. CT., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5,
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
172.
ICC Dismisses Case Against Kenya’s Ruto, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 5, 2016), https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/kenya-ruto-hear-icc-case-dropped-160405065408564.html.
173.
Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 170.
174.
Id.
175.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 120–21.
176.
Id.
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independent judicial body has been undermined. Until the Court addresses
its lack of legitimacy, it will continue to lose the respect and support of
African states and leaders, and those leaders will continue to undermine its
work.

IV. Solutions
If the Court continues down this path, the AU may move ahead with its
threats to coordinate a mass withdrawal of its Member States from the
Rome Statute. It is unlikely that the legitimacy the ICC does have could
177
withstand such a withdrawal. Thus, in order to maintain some form of
legitimacy, the Court needs to either move away from the overt
politicization of its decisions or establish complementarity with the local
courts of African states.

A. Mass Withdrawal
Since al-Bashir’s indictment in 2009, the AU has proposed various
178
solutions to side-step the ICC. The two that gained the most traction with
AU Member States were the proposals to institute a mass withdrawal of
African states from the Rome Statute and to create an independent, African
179
court with the same subject-matter jurisdiction as the ICC. So far, neither
180
plan has been fully implemented. While each proposed solution has its
merits and drawbacks, the creation of an AU court that has an overlapping
jurisdiction with the ICC is the better idea.
After its bi-annual summit held in January 2017, the AU “[a]dopt[ed]
the [AU] ICC withdrawal strategy along with its Annexes, and call[ed] on
181
Member States to consider implementing its recommendations.” The
AU’s withdrawal strategy calls for mass withdrawal based on “the systemic

177.
Id. Unfortunately, the ICC lacks the institutional legitimacy that the UN enjoys as a
result of its near universal membership and the support it receives from the most powerful
states.
178.
Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 386–388.
179.
Konstantinos D. Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi, The International Criminal Court’s
Involvement with Africa: Evaluation of a Fractious Relationship, 82 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 417,
445 (2013).
180.
As of this writing, Burundi is the only African nation to have withdrawn from the
ICC. See supra note 69. The AU adopted the Malabo Protocol in 2014 with the intent of
merging the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the African Court on Peoples’
and Human Rights to create a court that would give African states primary jurisdiction over
international and transnational crimes. The Protocol needs to be ratified by fifteen states to
become effective, but so far it has only been ratified by seven. Maram Mahdi, Africa’s
International Crimes Court Is Still a Pipe Dream, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, (Oct.
15, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-international-crimes-court-is-still-a-pipe-dream.
181.
African Union Assembly, 28th Sess., Draft Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/
AU/Draft/Dec.1(XXVIII) Rev.1, ¶ 8 (Jan. 30–31, 2017).
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imbalance in international decision-making processes.” The document
continues by highlighting the disproportionate and politically-motivated
nature of the UNSC’s (and thus the ICC’s) decision-making process:
[t]he inherent politics of such processes result in unreliable
application of the rule of law. In this regard, the decisions of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are made on the basis of
the interests of its Permanent Members rather than the legal and
justice requirements. Needless to say, these interests are not always
in line with those of Africa, thereby leading to a perception of a
183
double standard against African States.
While the AU’s call for African states to withdraw from the Rome
Statute and from the Court is understandable, it is ill-conceived. An exodus
of African states would severely limit the number of states over which the
Court has immediate jurisdiction. However, it would do little to stop
African leaders from being indicted, as the UNSC’s referral power allows
the Court to side-step the sovereign immunity of all UN Member States,
184
even those that are not party to the Rome Statute.
In the Constitutive Act of the African Union, its founding document,
the AU claims that one of its goals is to ensure that the human rights of the
185
peoples of Africa are promoted and protected. A withdrawal from the only
body that is investigating and holding leaders accountable for the atrocities
they commit would only serve to indicate that the AU believes maintaining
political power is more important than securing and maintaining the rights
and safety of the peoples of African states. Thus, instead of bolstering the
AU’s place in the sphere of international justice, a mass withdrawal would
only serve to further undermine the international rule of law and place a
186
spotlight on the AU as a hypocritical organization.
Notably, the loudest individual voices calling for the withdrawal of AU
Member States from the ICC are those of leaders whose participation in
conflicts within their own countries could rise to the level of an international
187
crime. The call for withdrawal therefore seems to be a self-serving and
hypocritical attempt to shield actors who are committing egregious crimes
from the reach of the Court. Yet, as shown above, the UNSC’s reach is long
and simple withdrawal from the Court may not prevent these actors from
being charged with committing international crimes in the future. Therefore,
mass withdrawal would only create bad optics for the AU and the leaders of

182.
See Withdrawal Strategy Document, supra note 68, ¶ 8 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf.
183.
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184.
See Part II supra.
185.
A.U. Charter pmbl., art. 2.
186.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 116.
187.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 116.

Spring 2020]

Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC

221

its constituent Member States and could delegitimize the regional body in
188
the eyes of the international community.

B. Creation of a Regional International Crimes Court
While the AU’s withdrawal proposal is ill-advised, its proposal to
establish an international criminal section of the African Court of Justice
189
and Human and Peoples’ Rights is more meritorious. After discussing the
latter proposal, the AU released a draft protocol to implement the proposal
on June 27, 2014, called the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, or the Malabo
190
Protocol. The newly proposed section of the African Court would have
the same subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes as the
191
ICC.
A regional court with concurrent jurisdiction would serve the interests
of both the ICC and the AU. Because the ICC steps in where there is no
local court that is able to prosecute, the introduction of a regional court
would help to limit the amount of time and resources it extends on the
continent. The AU would also benefit from such an arrangement, if the
regional court is able to mete out justice to the perpetrators of international
crimes in a manner that is impartial, effective, and efficient.
However, even a regional court would still have to contend with issues
of sovereign immunity. Foreseeing this problem, the draft protocol prevents
192
heads of state from being prosecuted while they are in office. This
protection disappears once they leave office: The proposal dictates that “the
official position of any accused person shall not relieve such person of
193
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” Nevetheless, as it relates
to the pursuit of justice, the AU’s proposal is undoubtedly more limited in
its ability to touch heads of state than the Rome Statute as it prevents the
prosecution of heads of state while they hold office. While the proposal’s
drafters may see that as a win, it risks creating even more dictatorships on

188.
See e.g., Regine Cabato, Philippines Leaves International Criminal Court as
Duterte Probe Is Underway, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/philippines-leaves-international-criminal-court-as-duterte-probe-underway/
2019/03/18/f929d1b6-4952-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html (speaking on the international
perception of Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte after he withdrew his country from the
Rome Statute in March 2019).
189.
Malabo Protocol, supra note 63.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. art. 28A. Both courts would hear matters on genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and crimes of aggression but, as it was meant to be more expansive and
transnational, the African Court also has jurisdiction over other matters that the ICC does not,
including the crimes of unconstitutional change of government, money laundering, illicit
exploitation of natural resources, etc. Id.
192.
Id. art. 46A bis.
193.
Id., art. 46B(2).
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the continent. Namely, if the best way for heads of state to avoid charges is
by never leaving office, it is likely that, given the opportunity, they will
attempt to remain in power indefinitely.
Furthermore, the AU’s proposal does run into at least one additional
issue: Inter-state power dynamics are bound to weave themselves into the
decisions of regional courts. A regional court has the potential to encounter
the same problems the ICC faces, with more globally dominant countries
exerting control over the operations of the court. Just as in the global
context, certain states within Africa wield more power and wealth than
others, and these are usually the states that have greater influence over the
194
actions of the rest of the continent. It follows, then, that these same states
and their leaders have the potential to control the prosecutorial agenda of the
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights. This domination
has the power to undermine the legitimacy of that court just as much as the
UNSC’s domination has the power to undermine the ICC’s legitimacy.

C. Solutions for the ICC
There are changes that the ICC can make to regain some legitimacy in
the eyes of the AU and its supporters, thereby preventing the mass
withdrawal of African states. Severing or lessening the relationship between
the ICC and the UNSC, returning to the expected principles of fairness and
transparency that brought African nations on board, and making an effort to
work alongside the legal and cultural institutions that are in place in African
nations to counter the impression that they are working against them would
help the Court to regain some of its legitimacy.
The ICC could minimize or sever its relationship with the UNSC. As
the relationship stands, the UNSC exerts too much influence over the Court.
This is both hypocritical, as three-fifths of the Security Council’s permanent
members are not themselves Parties to the Rome Statute, and problematic,
195
as the UNSC politicizes the Court and its work. Indeed, it is particularly
disturbing when the Court argues “that it derives its moral authority from its
claim to pursue international criminal law on legal rather than political
196
grounds.” The Court’s flawed self-narrative cloaks it in pretense and
strengthens the AU’s evidence against it by showing that the Court is being
deliberately hypocritical in how it operates or naively unaware of how it
actually functions in the world.
To restore its legitimacy with African states, the Court should also
engage in other forms of what scholars have dubbed “hypocrisy

194.
Power Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/news/
best-countries/power-rankings (last visited Dec. 17, 2019) (ranking Egypt, South Africa, and
Nigeria as the three most powerful nations on the African continent).
195.
Seymour, supra note 6, at 111.
196.
Id. at 110.
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197

management.” In essence, the Court should realign itself with the ideals
that brought African states on board with the implementation of the Court
decades ago. In particular, the Court must return to being a body that seeks
justice under law and which is not motivated by politics. To re-establish this
ideal, the Court must, if it retains its connections to the UNSC, make
transparent, published, and in-depth evaluations of the merits of any UNSC
charging recommendations. Such measures would allow the Court to at least
appear impartial.
Additionally, the Court should work with the social and political
mechanisms that exist in the specific regions where it is engaged. Because
“the ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it
operates, is Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and stand points
it reflects and embeds are uncompromisingly European,” it is almost
inevitable that Western norms and ideas permeate the operations of the
198
Court. Like nearly every other international organization, “[d]istinctively
Euro-American ideals and narratives determine [its] perspectives and
199
standpoints.” This is because Europe acts as a “geographical, political,
200
and conceptual epicentre of international legal thought.” In using the
mechanisms created by and employed by Western and European countries,
the Court runs the risk of isolating non-Western countries like those in
Africa.
In contrast, if it employs a prosecutorial system that fits within the
structures that currently exist in each region, the Court has a greater chance
of building relationships with states and of ultimately receiving their
201
cooperation and support. In particular, the Court could undertake two
simple measures that would allow for better integration and cooperation
between itself and AU Member States. First, the ICC Prosecutor could
travel to all African states to meet with regional judiciary, prosecutors,
lawyers, and civil society in an attempt to establish constituencies in each
country that would help create or enhance support for the Court. Second, the
President of the Court and the President of the Assembly of States Parties
could plan and engage in “programmatic activities at the national, regional
and international levels for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers from state
parties to enhance [their] knowledge and understanding of the ICC’s work
202
and to enhance complementarity within the state parties.” This is vital to
the Court retaining (or regaining) its legitimacy, especially in Africa.
Id. at 121–22.
Awol K. Allo, The ICC’s Problem Is Not Overt Racism, It Is Eurocentricism, AL
JAZEERA (July 28, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/icc-problem-simpleracism-eurocentricism-180725111213623.html.
199.
Id.
200.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
201.
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Remember that the relationship between the ICC and the AU soured
because of the Court’s perceived bias in prosecuting African leaders.
Requiring the leaders of the Court to visit African states could help to
improve the standing of the Court across the continent by offering an
alternate view of the work the ICC does. Unsurprisingly, citizens of each
AU Member State are likelier to come across their leaders’ sentiments about
the ICC than the ICC’s own representations of its actions. By presenting its
own narrative to African peoples, the ICC could help bolster its reputation
with the citizens of each country by offering an alternate view of the work
the Court is attempting to accomplish. As a result of hearing alternative
perspectives, each citizen would be better positioned to form an independent
opinion of the Court’s value. Furthermore, linkages between the Court and
local justice systems should help both the Court and local justice
organizations bring about an equitable end to the impunity that plagues so
many African states.
Not only would this effort enhance the ICC’s visibility and credibility,
but it would also enhance the role of national legal systems through
complementarity. Because it is bound by the principle of complementarity,
the ICC can only investigate and prosecute international crimes when
203
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so. The principle
reflects the idea that it is preferable for international crimes to be
204
investigated and prosecuted in the country where they occurred.
Moreover, when local courts assist the ICC in carrying out its duties, it is a
boon for a body that does not have a police force. This is particularly true in
countries that are not signatories to the Rome Statute.
Additionally, this cooperation could help the Court learn how to work
within the justice systems that are already in place in each country. Learning
the particularities of each country’s justice system could allow the Court to
work within or around the legal and cultural institutions at work in each
nation. Each African country has a legal system that in some respects
operates differently from the Euro-American system that the ICC uses and
that these countries are already hostile to. By creating a system which
integrates aspects of those countries where it is investigating a crime, the
Court has a greater chance of securing cooperation. This integration does
not necessarily mean adopting the laws or rules of any given state, it could
be as simple as holding proceedings in the country or in the region—a
proposal suggested by the UNSC when it issued the Resolution for al205
Bashir’s arrest.
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V. Closing Remarks
The ICC’s blanket rejection of sovereign immunity and its close
relationship with the UNSC delegitimize the Court. As an organization that
relies on the cooperation of states across the world, this is something the
Court cannot afford. While the ICC must be seen as a fair and impartial
body in order to function, its decade-long fight with the African Union over
the disproportional charges levelled against African nationals has weakened
its stature with African states. This has led the AU to call for a mass
withdrawal of African nations from the ICC and to propose the
implementation of its own regional court to handle international matters. In
order to repair its relationship with the AU and the African continent, the
ICC needs to confront and remedy its own biases before it can expect to
(re)gain the respect and cooperation of African states and their leaders. In
order to do this, the Court has to sever or lessen its relationship with the
UNSC which causes it to be more political than its original mandate
intended, implement a system that allows for transparency (especially as it
relates to UNSC Resolutions), and work with the legal and cultural
institutions that are in place in the region to help foster cooperation among
the parties. Impunity for international crimes is rampant on the continent.
As it stands, the ICC is the only court that can hold those responsible to
account, but its legitimacy hangs in the balance. If that remains true, it will
be a detriment to the peoples of Africa.

including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to
regional efforts in the fight against impunity”).

